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Origins of the Irish News Agency
The theme of identity forged in adversity has bulked large on the agenda of the
founders of many small nation states, and the case of Ireland is no exception. The extent
and nature of the Irish diaspora, in addition, has given this theme an added dimension:
its propagation to the world at large. Bending the world's ear to the cause of righting
. Ireland's wrongs has been a constant, if rarely successful, strand in Irish nationalist
policy for over two centuries. It is only in more recent times, however, that it has become
more formally associated with the official structures of the State, most notably in the
seven-year experimental existence of the Irish News Agency (I.N.A.). The history of this
institution, unique in the Irish administrative system, provides us with important
perspectives on government ideology in relation to Northern Ireland and in relation to
the news media themselves, as well as on the nature of professional journalism in
Ireland in the 1950s.
In 1945 Sean MacBride, recently elected to the Dail and founder of the Clann na
Poblachta party, wrote to Eamonn de Valera ('Dear Chief). with whom he had evidently
been in contact earlier on the same Issue, urging the establishment of an Irish news
agency to put Ireland's arguments· about partition to the world, and to obviate the
situation whereby all news about Ireland carried on the international news agencies was
sub-edited - often prejudicially - in London 1 . De Valera passed the proposal on to the
Director of the Government Information Bureau, Frank Gallagher (an able
newspaperman who had been the first editor of the Irish Press, and who had
subsequently found refuge in Mr de Valera's service after tangling with the newspaper's
board of management). MacBride was nothing If not enthusiastic: in a period of some
five weeks at the end of the year, he wrote to de Valera and Gallagher three times,
setting out his conviction that such a Government-subsidized agency was essential

I. MacBride to de Valera, 14 May
1945. National Archives, S
14544A.

a) 'to counter hostile propaganda'.
b) because other countries had officially supported news agencies,
c) because it was unlikely that an Irish News Agency would be a paying proposition
in its early years, and
d) that private setting up of the agency would mean that it would be 'under the
2
control of financial interests' •
Gallagher (and, one presumes, de Valera). expressed reservations. Gallagher's first
objection was that the action of the Dail in voting public money to support such an
undertaking would be so misrepresented 'as to kill all hope of the agency ever
succeeding'. In other countries, he observed wistfully, governments were freer to 'do a
good national act without it being made into a crime'. Sensing. a log-jam, MacBride
backtracked, suggesting in his last letter that all-party agreement for the agency might
be secured, and that the best option might be that the editors or managements of the
three Dublin dailies might be asked to consider and report on the possibility of setting
up the agency themselves. The latter proposal was the first to get under Gallagher's
guard. The whole situation would have a different aspect', he averred, 'if the Initiative
3
came from the pressmen' • Nonetheless, this too was shelved.
It was some three and a half years later that MacBride, as the newly-appointed
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2. MacBride to de Valera. 6
November 1945, MacBride to
Gallagher, 15 November 1945, 6
December 1945. National Archives,
S 14544 A.

3. Gallagher to MacBride, 15
November 1945, 30 November
1945, 8 December 1945. National
Archives, S 14544 A.
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4. Dail Debates (otherwise DD).
16 November 1949, VoL 118, Col.
977. He gave no further details of
the Incident, which may have been
In relation to a dispute Involving
the Irish Press.

5. 6 Mulmhneachain to Boland,
23 May 1949. National Archives, S
14544A.

6. National Archives, S 14544 (as
are subsequent quotations, unless
otherwise identified).

Minister for External Affairs, was at last in a position to put his theory into practice. His
qualifications were not only political but professiona]. For many years he was a
correspondent for the French Havas news agency (later to be incorporated into Agencies
France Presse). was a member of the National Union of Journalists, and took pride in
telling the Dail that he was 'probably the only member to go out on strike and picket a
newspaper office' 4 . His searches in the governmental archives were fruitless - de Valera
had apparently removed one of the relevant files on leaving office, regarding it as
personal 5 - but his enthusiasm was undimmed by the passage of time. In January 1949
a memorandum from the Department of External Affairs to the Government noted that
'while we have 32, 171 civil servants, there is not one of them who is charged with any
6
function in relation to partition' . The contrast with the situation prevailing in Northern
Ireland was underlined.
On 18 May, the proposal was fleshed out in a more detailed memorandum, proposing
the establishment of an Irish News Agency whose publications
should include reports of important pronouncements on partition. It
should, be strictly non-party and non-political in the sense that it
should only deal with matters of foreign policy and matters that are
non-controversial at home.
It would be run with a small government subsidy by a company specially established for

the purpose.
The [Agency's] Diplomatic Correspondent would in effect be the
Government spokesman and propagandist. His task would be to
publicize in the form of news the Government's policy on partition.
There would be offices in London and New York, and the annual cost to public funds
would be of the order of £20,000. Three days later, the Government minutes discreetly
recorded the approval of a 'number of proposals ... in connection with partition', of
which the creation of the Irish News Agency was undoubtedly one.

7.

No. 33 of 1949.

The next task was the passage of the necessary legislation, and the promotion of the
concept to Irish public and journalistic opinion. The latter task was far from ea~y:
influential sections of journalistic opinion were implacably opposed to the creation of the
agency and were ultimately, as will be seen, partially responsible for its demise.
7

8. Sean MacBride, DD, 13 July
1949, Vol117, Col. 760.

Even before the Irish News Agency Bill reached the floor of the Dail, journalistic
sabres were being rattled in their scabbards. A low-key report in the Irish Independent
(17 June 1949) indicated that the service to be provided would be 'not elaborate' and
would be confined to airmail and short-wave radio. Two days later, its sister paper, the
Sunday Independent, went on the offensive. Money spent on the new agency would be
'largely wasted'. The Government's proposal, the paper added, 'smacks too much of a
plan to set up a propaganda department. Neither Ireland nor the rest of the world wants
it' (19 June 1949). MacBride moved swiftly into a damage limitation exercise. The new
agency, he told the Irish Independent In a special interview, 'will not replace existing
media for the supply of Irish news, but will supplement them' (27 June 1949). The editor
of the Irish Independent was unconvinced. The scheme, he commented, had 'not been
sufficiently thought out', and a committee to examine the proposal would, perhaps, be a
better idea (7 July 1949). Over in Westmoreland Street, The Irish Times (where the
editor, R.M. Smyllie, writing as 'Nichevo' indicated that he had briefly considered the
idea of starting an Irish news agency before abandoning the idea on grounds of cost) was
8
more patrician, but no less suspicious . 'We do not believe', it stated editorially, 'that the
existing news agencies are prejudiced against [Ireland] .. . Mr MacBride's diminutive
agency certainly will not galvanise the apathetic audiences of the great world into a state
of appreciation' (15 July 1949).
The opposition to MacBride was formidable, both inside and outside the Dail. Inside,
sean Lemass was at his most rumbustious. Additionally he had, as Managing Director
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of the Irish Press newspaper (a position he Was offered when Flanna Fail were put out of
office the previous year, and one which he had embraced with his customary vigour and
enthusiasm). more than a passing interest in this particular scheme. Flanna Fail, out of
office for the first time since 1932, had a truffle-hound's nose for proposals that were
conceptually or financially shaky, and Lemass, especially where matters of company
legislation were concerned, had a keener nose than most. Outside, the National Union of
Journalists (or at least some of Its adherents) was getting Its lobbying apparatus Into
gear. The NUJ, although weak, was in the process of establishing Itself as the major
trade union for journalists in Ireland. It had more than four times the membership of its
main rival, the Institute of Journalists.
The main plank of MacBride's argument was, indeed, the one calculated to appeal
most to Flanna Fail: the thesis that Ireland should throw off the shackles of domination
by the foreign news agencies as it had thrown off those of foreign political domination.
'Because of transmission difficulties, because of our unimportance, if you like, in the
stream of world affairs', he told the Dail, 'all the news that emanates in Ireland is
canalised through London'. The need for an independent source of news about Ireland
was threefold:
first of all, unlike most other countries we have a national objective
to achieve. We still have to gain full control of our own country ... We
have to counteract a good deal of foreign propaganda ... We need
news channels of our own in order to encourage the development of
our industrial life. of our foreign trade, of our tourist traffic. to make
known our cultural developments and also to make known our
9
viewpoints in the field of international affairs as the need arises.

9. DD, 13 July 1949, Vol 117,
Col. 760.

Blithely quoting de Valera himself (who had told the Dail the previous year
that the dwindling flow of emigrants to those countries ·most sympathetic to
us' necessitated the provision of fresh channels of communication), he made
no bones about the fact that the new service would not be a paying
proposition, and underlined Its principal function as a conduit for the
Government's anti-partition policy abroad. Some of his arguments were
acceptable only if his listeners were prepared to accept that the same word
could embody two different and opposed meanings within the compass of a
single paragraph ... It Is not,
10. Ibid. Col. 761.

to be a propaganda machine or a machine which will present news
other than In an objective, truthful and accurate way. It may be said
that it will serve as a propaganda medium in so far as one of its main
functions will be to place Ireland on the map and that to that extent
it will be serving a proganda service by making Ireland known
throughout the world in different spheres. w
It was not intended that the news agency should be the official mouthpiece
of the Government: that function was being very efficiently performed by the
Government Information Bureau II -but, when necessary, 'it will give Ireland's
viewpoint on political affairs'. It was not going to be a 'political propaganda
machine', but one of its essential functions would be to negative 'unfriendly,
hostile or sensational propaganda about Ireland 12 •
This stylish exercise in having your cake and eating it was. accompanied by the
offering of one substantial - and ultimately fatal - hostage to fortune: an undertaking
that the new INA would not deal in 'hot news', I.e. the kind of news that daily and weekly
Irish media were generally in the habit of collecting for themselves. This commitment
was evidently designed to mollifY the NUJ, whose members' low earnings were frequently
supplemented by work as correspondents for larger or foreign media enterprises. In the
event, It failed to do even that and, in addition, presented the Opposition with a weapon
which It used to considerable effect.
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11. Official flies document a
certain amount of mutual
antipathy between the Information
Section In the Department of
External
Affairs
and
the
Government Information Bureau.
Cf. National Archives, S 4858,
especially memoranda from Patrick
Lunch,
Secretary
to
the
Government, complaining that
Conor Cruise O'Brien In the
Department of External Affairs
Information section tended to 'foist
on the Information Bureau ... work
of an arduous nature which Is
sometimes not obviously related to
the proper functions of the
Department'.

12. DD, 13 July 1949, Vol. 117,
Col. 762.
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13. Ibid., Col819.

14. Ibid., Col. 832.

De Valera defended his own record by arguing that what he had most in mind was
the proposed short-wave service (viewed with some disfavour by the Inter-Party
Government}, but it was left to Sean Lemass to mount the most ferocious attack on
MacBride for 'setting up a company which will not be a company and ... a news agency
which will not be a news agency' 13 . Th~ NUJ troops came in behind Lemass in the s h ape
of Sean McCann, a senior journalist on the Irish Press and a Flanna Filii deputy, who
told the Dail that he was 'speaking on behalf of working journalists who feel that their
livelihood is being attacked in this Bill'. If the agency became, in time, a paying
proposition, 'that can only mean that the agency will be in competition with other
14
journalists who send 'copy' out of this country' •
In point of fact, the agency was, in the Bill, given the powers normally pertaining to a
news agency, i.e. power to distribute news inside Ireland. When this was pointed out by
an Opposition deputy who wanted to limit the dissemination of news to places outside
the country, Mr MacBride gave his reasons. If such a statutory ban were in place, the
agency would, for example, be unable to provide news to the proposed short wave
service. Nor would it be able to disseminate news to the Irish-based correspondents of
foreign newspapers and agencies.

15. DD, 16 November 1949, Vol.
118, Col. 952.

16. Ibid., Col. 958.

If he had thought that the latter explanation would blunt the edge of the attack by
the resident correspondents of American and other agencies, the Minister was being too
optimistic by half. His principal opponent, Sean Lemass, immediately focused on the
central flaw in the Government's strategy: if the agency did not disseminate 'hot news', it
would not be an agency; if it did, it would imperil the livelihood of Irish journalists,
because foreign newspapers and magazines will be supplied with 'free news' by civil
servants, while trade union journalists who depend for a living on the dissemination of
news to foreign journals will be forced into unemploymene 5 .
MacBride had in fact already met an NUJ deputation, whose anxieties, quite
naturally, were that in so far as it was possible, the staffing of the news agency should
be from members of the NUJ or some other recognised trade union 16 . These anxieties he
was prepared to meet in full: the other matters raised by the union in the circular which
had been sent to Lemass were not raised 'as such' by the delegation. Taking MacBride's
words at face value, what appears to have happened is that there were two schools' of
thought within the NUJ: the central, organizational one related to the need to ensure
that journalistic work continued to be performed by journalists, whether they were
employed by the State or by anyone else: the second, reflecting the special interest of a
sub-set of NUJ members, saw the agency as a direct threat- not to their livelihoods, for
most if not all of them were in senior editorial positions in major Dublin media - but to
the additional payment they received for acting as 'stringers' for foreign news agencies.
MacBride correctly identified the union's major concern, but dangerously
underestimated the power and influence of the foreign correspondents' group, as later
events made clear.
The agency thus created was an oddly-shaped enterprise. According to the brief given
to it by its progenitor in the Dail, it was to be occupied primarily with publicising the
Government's attitude on partition abroad; it would work in harmony with the existing
media; it would be a small organisation costing around £20,000 per year in public
subsidies, and issuing possibly 1,000 words a day; it would not deal in 'hot news'; and it
would be assisted by an Advisory Board, which might also facilitate the eventual
takeover of the agency by the national newspapers.

The first year
17. National Archives, S. 14544 A

As things turned out, virtually every one of these parameters had been shattered
within the agency's first year in operation. November 1950 saw a major reversal of
policy: 'the task of publicizing partition abroad', Mr MacBride told Mr Lemass in the
Dail, 'is the responsibility of other agencies ... The INA is not an organ of propaganda' 17 •
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While it was certainly true that the anti-Partition aspect of the proposed agency's
activities had not figured as fully in the Dail debates as it had in the Cabinet
discussions, this abrupt change of policy created a certain vacuum at the heart of the
agency's activities, which was filled rapidly by a decision, taken by the new Board, to go
into the business of providing 'hot news' both inside Ireland and overseas. This decision
was taken for two reasons: because of a feeling by the Board that the agency's work on
behalf of Ireland abroad would not be taken seriously by other media unless it was also
acting as a normal news agency, and in order to broaden its revenue base. It was, of
course, completely in conflict with the Minister's statements to the Dail, and Mr
MacBride, 'while evidently regretting that he had been so explicit In the matter, agreed
11
that the Board would have to act as it considered best.' ' . It also immediately
undermined any possibility of a friendly relationship with the rest of the domestic
media. The agency grew rapidly in size, and in the scope of its aclivilies: within a year of
its establishment it was producing about 9,000 words a day. The Advisory Board was
never set up.
The fact that the INA was certainly not a news agency in the generally accepted sense
of the term did not deter those most directly associated with It, or those who saw it as a
useful new career outlet in a country in which there had been little media change for at
least a quarter of a century. There were some 200 applications for staff positions, and to at least some surprise- the position of General Manager was given, on 18 May 1950,
to Joseph Gallagher, a journalist who had been born in London (his father came from
Enniskillen}, but who had no Irish journalistic experience. Another key appointment was
that of Brendan Malin, an Irish Press journalist with considerable experience of the Dail
and pollttcal reporting, later to become an editor in Boston. The first Board comprised

Board meeting, INA. from left: Robert Brennan (Director}, Noel Hartnett (Director}, Roger Greene
(Chairman], Peadar O'Curry (Director}, Conor Cruise O'Brien (Managing Direc(or).
Photo: Courtesty of Hugh Hartnett.

the Dublin solicitor Roger Greene (Chairman). Tonor Cruise O'Brien, (Managing
Director: this was only one of Dr. O'Brien's responsibilities: he retained others in his role
as a Counsellor in the Department of External Affairs). and Board members Peadar
19
O'Curry (later editor of the Irish Catholic). Robert Brennan and Noel Hartnetl •
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IB. Draft of Memorandum for
Government, Department of
External Affairs, I953, National
Archives. DFA 4221 I I I 1613

I9. Robert Brennan was a friend
of de Valera's and
Irish
Ambassador to Washington who
had also been active In Sinn Fein
publicity during the War of
Independence. He served later as
Director of Radio Eireann. He
eventually later resigned on
grounds from the INA Board on
grounds of ill-health. Noel Hartnett
resigned on becoming a member of
Seanad Eireann. They were
replaced by Messrs. John Grehan
and Andrew McDonnell. Roger
Greene died in 1955, when he was
replaced by F.W. Padbury, of the
eponymous advertising agency.
who In addition functioned as
Managing Director, Dr. Conor
Cruise O'Brien having retired in
June I955 after giving 'valuable
services In setting up and carrying
on the agency' (Report of the InterDepartmental Committee on the
l!ish News Agency, 16 March I955.
National Archives, S 14544 D).
Other directorial appointments
made at this time Included Mr
Seamus O'Farrell. a journalist and
former senator, Senator J .G.
Lennon. a Northern Nationalist
member of the Stormont Senate,
and Mr. P. Smyth ..

ARTIClES
20. John
Healy,
personal
Interview, 2 May 1983. John Healy
at one stage became 'Joan Dufty,
INA Woman Feature Writer,' after
provincial papers had asked the
INA for a series of features of
Interest to female readers.

21. The Irish Times, 28 November
1959.

22. Its rapid development of an
esprit de corps can be seen from
the fact that the proposal to
appoint Douglas Gageby as Editor
in Chief led to unrest and the
threat of industrial action, because
he was an outsider. John Healy,
personal interview.

23. Later with the Irish Press,
editor of the Catholic Herald. a
senior editorial executive with R1E
and editor of the Carlow
NatiDnalist.

24. He had suggested a somewhat
similar arrangement as far back as
192 1, but the Idea had been
overtaken by the Civil War crisis.
Brennan to Taoiseach, 12 July
1952. National Archives S 14544.

25. Department of Foreign Affairs,
Memorandum for the Government,
July 1952. National Archives, S
14544 B.

The agency began its work unofficially by carrying out an Interview with the
Taolseach, John A Costello, which was circulated Internationally In time for St. Patrick's
Day, 1950. Its first official reporting assignment for the new agency was coverage of the
St. Columbanus celebrations In Luxeuil In France In the summer of 1950. What the
latter had to do with publicizing Ireland's anti-partition policy abroad demanded a
certain effort of the imagination, but the air was already thick with flying straws. A
checklist on 9 November revealed that the bulk of items published as a result of the
agency's labours had been in newspapers or magazines in Ireland Itself, 312 In all,
compared with 60 in the United States and 28 in other countries. In other words, much
of the output of an agency designed for the export trade was In fact coming home to
roost. This was particularly true of the British media, who - if they used INA copy at all
- tended to use It only in the Irish editions of their publications, thus totally frustrating
20
the Intentions of the agency's founder .
The Irish Times, alone among Irish media, was relieved. Editorially welcoming the
'change of heart' It detected In the Minister's remarks in the Dail, it suggested that
criticism ... that seeks to sap confidence in It at this early stage is unworthy as well as
unwise'. The agency's was a 'likely youngster', and the criticisms of it in the provincial
press emanated from 'a common source' 21 • Indeed, in the first two years of its existence,
the agency operated with vigour and professionalism: even at this remove in time, It is
possible to sense something of the excitement that is generated by the launch of a new
media Institution staffed by able and keen young journalists22 . Its total staff (including
clerical, administrative and despatch personnel) numbered 48 by September 1952,
including nine in London and two in Belfast. Along with some 100 free-lance
correspondents, its staff journalists included Douglas Gageby as Editor in Chief, Jack
Smyth, Derry Moran, John Healy (later 'Backbencher'). Karl Ross, Aidan O'Hanlon,
23
Desmond Fisher (the INA 'Economics Editor' in 1953-54) , Philip Mooney, Lochlynn
MacGlynn, Kevin O'Kelly (the INA Picture Editor), Kevin Collins and Michael Finlan. It
had secured a back-to-hack agreement with the Hearst-controlled INS news service in
the United States, whereby INS carried INA-generated stories for its American clients,
while the INA had a monopoly on selling the INS service to Irish media clients. This
arrangement, which echoed Robert Brennan's priorities in particular24 , was seen as
essential to the INA's successful functioning. So was its new photographic department,
which achieved a coup of a kind by securing international distribution for the 'now
famous picture of rioting in Derry City, showing Six-County policemen dispersing
unarmed demonstrators'. Almost two decades before the Derry Civil Rights march was
televized across the globe, the photograph was already a potent Instrument of political
policy: this particular picture. the agency proudly informed the government, was known
to have reached an audience of 8,500,000 people, and it was 'probably the first time that
a highly important political fact- viz. that partition is maintained by force- has been so
effectively brought across to an audience of large dimensions' 25 • The quasi-monopoly in
the handling of Irish news for the world's press', the Agency's Board added with
satisfaction, 'once possessed by two or three of the great international news agencies, is
now broken. Secondly ... the state of affairs whereby all Irish news was edited in London
26
before issue ... is now a thing of the past'.

Critics of the INA
26. Draft Report of the Irish News
Agency to the Minister for External
Affairs for 1951-52, National
Archives, S 14544 B.

While the new agency was thus trumpeting its triumphs, however, other forces, seen
and unseen, were already gnawing away at its foundations. Professional journalistic
pique (allied, in the case of the Irish Press, to political pique) at the well-subsidized
nature of the agency's activities, was rapidly coming to the boil. From a different but
equally predictable perspective, senior civil servants In the Department of Finance,
viewing with alarm the agency's apparently insatiable appetite for cash advances,
regarded with a growing scepticism Its increasingly articulate but ultimately
unconvincing promises of better times to come.
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Paddy Quinn, the Reuter correspondent In Dublin and a senior journalist on the
Independent, voiced his displeasure about the activities of the INA to the Department of

the Taoiseach to such an effect that an Investigation was set up. The Irish Press,
enraged that an INA despatch on the famous 'Battle of Baltlnglass' had been published
In the Gaelic American, thundered editorially that It was 'a shameful perversion of the
27
truth. And the Irish public has to pay for it' •

27. Irish Press, 3 January 1951.
The 'Battle of Baltinglass' was a
political dispute centred on the
appointment of a sub-postmaster
in the Co. Wicklow village of the
san1e name.

The change of government on 14 June 1951 was accompanied by an Intensification
of NUJ pressure. In Itself this was not surprising: members of the new administration
had been openly hostile to the INA at Its Inception, and the NUJ presumably expected
that they eould now count on new and powerful allies at court. Against the run of play,
the new Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken, hesitated, his scepticism held In
check by some powerful lobbying from Within his own Department. Opposition
questions from Fine Gael deputies Oliver J. Flanagan and Patrick Cogan, among others,
pressed the Minister on the extent to which the INA was prepared to go into open
competition with existing Irish media (as was indeed already happening). Aiken kicked
to touch: the matters raised were 'soldy the responsibility of the board of directors of the
Irish News Agency'. Lurking In his ministerial brief was a sheaf of arguments from Conor
Cruise O'Brien, Including the fact that 'Nationalist Ulster' was particularly appreciative
of the INA's work.
At one point, Indeed, Aiken moved onto the offensive In support of the agency. The
occasion was when the Irish Independent published an editorial on 8 May 1952
complaining at the fact that the INA's picture desk, which acted as the Irish agency for
the International Planet photographic group, had been issuing photographs of 'vast and
enthusiastic crowds carrying giant portraits of Marshal Stalin lh Red Square'. The
offending picture had in fact been published In the previous day's Issue of the Evening
Herald. 'I do not allege,' Aiken told Sir John Esmonde, the Fine Gael TD who had
unwisely raised the matter In the Dail,
that the crowds In Red Square carried the giant portraits of Marshal
Stalin because they were following the example of the Irish
Independent, but within the last couple of years the Independent
published pictures of Marshal Stalin with a smiling face; Marshal
Stalin drinking a toast at the Kremlin; Marshal Stalin at dinner; and
at least three other pictures of the same gentleman ... Indeed the
Independent was so keen on publishing what it now calls Russian
propaganda that in 1950 it ordered direct from the UP-Planet, and
published, another photograph of massed units of the Red Army
parading through Red Square.
Warming to his task, he went on to Inform the Dail that 'the manager of the INA is the
son of a TD, the brother of another, and brother of a senator. It will be news to these
members of the Oireachtas that they are harbouring the chief of an anti-American, pro28
Russian cell' .
The discussions with the NUJ had been precipitated by a demarche to de Valera on
22 November 1951 from T.P. Kilfeather, on behalf of the Olreachtas Press Gallery,
expressing the Gallery's 'grave concern' at the 'unfair and unjust competition' of the INA,
and expressing its alarm at the 'continued encroachment' of the INA, whose activities
29
should be confined to those 'not harmful to Irish journalists' . The nationality of those
journalists currently employed by the INA was, conveniently, Ignored. The agreement
between the INA and the NUJ, which Issued in a joint statement on 20 December, was a
victory for the latter In all but name. Its main effect was 'to prevent the agency from
selling domestic news or pictures to the Dublin dailies and the Cork Examiner ...
30
Commercially, the effects of the agreement were naturally adverse' . The agency's
defenders in the Department of External Affairs located responsibility for all of this In a
small but rather Influential group of journalists who

37

28. DO 15 May 1952, Vol. 131. No.
12. See also National Archives,
Department of Foreign Affairs file
340/12/88/9.

29. National Archives, S 14544.

30. Replies from Department of
Extermil Affairs to queries from
Cabinet sub-committee on the
future of the INA, 15 September
1952. National Archives, S 14544

B.
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are In large measure not engaged In the active collection of news. At
least 90 per cent hold editorial positions on the Dublin daily
newspapers and recast the news submitted to those newspapers by
working journalists who receive no payment for the exported
material. It Is easy to see why such vested Interests should be
continuously and actively vocal in their opposition to a national news
agency which pays cash for all news written. 31

31. Department of External Mfairs
memorandum to Department of
Finance, February 1953. National
Archives, S 14544 B.

32. Ibid.

33. Irish Independent, 8 December
1952.

34. Statement. 31 May 1954.
National Archives, S 14544 C.

The Independent alone numbered among Its staff journalists the Dublin
correspondents of the Press Association, Reuters, Associate Press, the Exchange
Telegraph, and a Canadian agency. External Affairs argued strongly that the agreement
was being eroded In practice, and that the editors of the Dublin dailies frequently
deplored It and urged the agency to scrap it, but without giving the agency any public
32
support on the Issue. Nor Indeed was the NUJ the only other organisation Involved.
The Institute of Journalists (IOJ) entered the fray twelve months later, with a statement
signed by Its secretary, Donal O'Donovan, registering a protest against the fact that
1ournalists, as taxpayers, are compelled to contribute to a subsidy which is being used
33
to menace their employment' . Eighteen months later, the Institute of Journalists,
together with the Guild of Journalists, warned the INA that It was unwise to deal with
the NUJ alone, and that the members of their organizations would not consider
34
themselves bound by any agreement between the INA and the larger union. The
Department of Foreign Affairs, In one of Its most waspish rejoinders, said that the IOJ
memorandum was 'known to have been drafted by Reuter's correspondent in Dublin'. 35

Financial Problems
35. Department of External Mfairs
Memorandum to Department of
Finance, February 1953. National
Archives, S 14544 B.

The hard-headed servants of the Minister for Finance were not so easily put off the
scent. Possibly emboldened by the knowledge that their new political masters were at
best undecided about the value of the INA. they moved to take control of the debate,
urging In a memorandum on 5 February 1952 that 'no time should be lost in
reorganizing the agency on economic lines'. At this point the agency's losses for 1951-52
were put at £45,000, and Its projected demand on the exchequer for the following year
was for £40,000. For Its part, the agency submitted a steady stream of figures•to
Finance, showing how the ratio between expenditure and Income was improving: the
following table shows Its funding situation over the first four years of Its operatlon. 36

36. Department of External Mfairs
Memorandum to Government, 29
June 1954. National Archives, S
14544 B.

37. Draft of Memorandum for
Government, Department of
Foreign Affairs, 1952, National
Archives, DEA 422/11/16/3.

INA FINDING, 1950 - 1954
Year

Total
Expenditure

Exchequer
Funding

Commercial
Sales

Exchequer as
%of total

1950-51
1951-52
1952-53
1953-54

£45,038
£46,335
£76,802
£62,546

£30,000
£45,000
£63,500
£45,000

£2,116
£4,253
£14,778
£17,922

91.8%
81.1%
71.04%

The Minister for External Affairs also argued that the method of financing the Agency
was inappropriate, in as much as the monies used In the first three years of Its
operation, although categorized as repayable cash advances, consisted In large part of
capital sums. In Its first year in operation, he demonstrated, the ratio of expenditure to
revenue had fallen from 129: I In the first quarter to 14.4:1 In the final quarter37 • The
Department of Finance, unimpressed, argued that the losses were Incurred because the
agency was
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merely duplicating at considerable cost to the taxpayer a service
which Irish newspapers are fully equipped to obtain from their own
reporting organisations or through foreign news agencies.
Furthermore, the value from a national standpoint of some, at least,
of the items transmitted abroad, e.g., strike of seamen at Dublin
port, sporting events, suspension of Marshall Aid, is questionable.

38. Department
of Finance
Memorandum to Government. 5
February 1952. National Archives,
S 14544 B.

The agency, it argued, should be developed in such a way as to facilitate Its eventual
38
disposal to the Irish newspapers to be run on a cooperative basis.
The matter was brought to a head in July 1952, when the Cabinet was faced with a
request for a supplementary estimate for the agency In ihe sum of £38,500. The Cabinet
eventually agreed, but with considerable reluctance: the price was the agreement of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs to the establishment, on 26 August 1952, of a special
Cabinet subccommittee to include, along with the two ministers most directly concerned,
the Minister for Education and the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. The Department
of Posts and Telegraphs submitted some well-meaning but naive suggestions for
reduction in costs, including the delightful proposal that foreign correspondents working
in Ireland should be 'invited to plug Irish news of importance on a fee basis'. The
Department of External Affairs shot down this particular brainwave with little difficulty:
it would be
open to the suggestion in Fleet Street that the Irish Government was
attempting to corrupt journalists. The stories that were 'plugged'
would stHI have to go to London offices who would be liable to throw
them out - unless indeed it Is suggested that fees should be paid in
London also, in which case the £15,000 suggested would not go very
39
far' .
The question of reorganization was shelved, but came up again the following year,
when a report on the agency's organization and methods was carried out by accountants
4(1
Urwick, Orr and Partners for the Department. The report suggested that no. great
changes could be recommended, and noted that 'discipline and morale undoubtedly
reflect the enthusiasm and driving force of the General Manager and the Editor In Chief.
The net cost to the agency of the Irish News Service (INS) of £4,000 per annum, it
advised, 'should clearly be accepted as a policy expense'.
In February 1953 Finance returned to the attack, stating bluntly that the agency
should be wound up. Its decision on the dissemination of 'hot news' had been
'completely at variance with the Minister's engagements to the Dail', and it had not been
demonstrated that a continuance of the INA was warranted by Its values as a national
institution. If it were to continue, Finance noted, with the air of a chess grandmaster
who has just checkmated an opponent,
there would be a need for careful supervision of the agency's
activities to ensure that only material clearly conducive to the
national Interest would be circulated by it for publication.
Intervention of this kind would, inevitably; lead to charges of Civil
Service control and Government Interference. The agency could
hardly hope to survive under such conditions' .41
External Affairs, replying, had to eat a certain amount of crow: the departure from the
undertaking made by Mr MacBride In the Dail was acknowledged :__ but this undertaking
itself had been unrealistic. That apart, the Department fell back on what was essentially
MacBride's old position: that to wind up the agency now would be a confession that
42
Ireland had failed 'to shake off Reuter's dominance over the field of Irish new~· .
The Cabinet agreed to subsidize the agency to the tune of £45,000 for 1953-54, but
determined that there should be no supplementary estimate, and that proposals for reorganisation would have to be tabled. The writing was plainly on the wall. The INA. for
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its part, staked everything on a last throw. It terminated its agreement with INS and, in
August 1953, made a new agreement with the United Press (despite the hostility of the
UP correspondent in Dublin). This Included taking over the UP contract with Radio
Eireann, and Involved the agency going on a 24-hour footing for the first time. The
Government - Initially unaware of this dramatic new commitment - was unimpressed,
and decided In February 1954 that External Affairs, Finance, and the Attorney-General
should consult on the drafting of a memorandum 'on the problems that would arise and
the financial commitments that would be involved if it were decided to wind up the
agency at an early date'. After this, events moved swiftly. Within a week, the
Government subvention had been reduced by £10,000. Six days after this, an External
Affairs memorandum revealed that the agency's assets were £64,240, and its liabilities
£441,718- more than half of the latter sum being due to UP under the terms of Its 10year contract. The Attorney-General reported that the agency was 'hopelessly insolvent'
and, on 26 February, the Cabinet agreed to provide the INA with £45,000 for 1954-55;
that there would be no funding for subsequent years, and that 'the agency should be
requested to take, without delay, whatever steps may be necessary in the light of the
43
decisions above' .
Roger Greene, the INA chairman, embarked on a frantic last-ditch attempt to stave
off closure. The British paper wall, he told Aiken on 11 March, would be strengthened
by a hostile International press. A critical question, of course, was whether the UP
agreement could be repudiated. Aiken plainly thought It could be, and told Greene on 26
March that It would be 'futile' to seek a reversal of the Government's decision. Greene,
while accepting that the UP contract could be terminated on a technicality, told Aiken
on 8 April that Reuters had already been in Dublin propositioning some of the agency
staff, and argued that 'the full significance of the Irish taxpayer having sunk
approximately £200,000 in financing an Irish agency through its difficult formative
years to hand it over to its main rival. a constant enemy of Ireland ... will not be lost on
you'. The NUJ, he added, was already offering to close ranks in the light of this threat to
the agency. Within the week, Greene had followed this up with a letter to de Valera,
saying that a Government decision to bankrupt the agency would be 'an event without
precedent in the history of the State'. Aiken replied on 23 April in a more eirenic tone,
asking what effect a new agreement with the NUJ would have on the INA finances. 'De
Valera, however, was less forthcoming, and did little more than forward a hostile opinion
from the Attorney-General. Alndrlas 6 Caoimh, to Greene, over his own signature, on 31
May.

Dissolution

44. National Archives, S 14544 C.

Another change of Government on 2 June 1954, gave the agency an unexpected
reprieve, and It seemed to enter an Indian summer. A Government decision on 2 July
1954 effectively rescinded the previous government's decision to wind up the agency,
but on condition that It ran a tight ship and submitted a further memorandum on its
plans. The new Minister for Finance, Gerard Sweetman, was not unfavourable. Writing
to Liam Cosgrave, the new Minister for External Affairs, on 20 August 1954, he argued
for increasing the INA's revenues rather than decreasing its expenditure, and that it
should be continued, at any rate, for a period.
I know unofficially, that there is a possibility of a proposal being put
forward that Radio Elreann should be governed by a corporation. I
am prepared to explore even the possibility of fusing the agency and
44
Radio Eire ann under the same direction.
The following week the Government decided to set up an inter-departmental committee
to examine the whole question, to reduce expenditure on the agency, and to explore
possible synergies with F6gra Elreann, Radio Eireann, and the Department of Posts and
Telegraphs, as well as the possibility of a new agreement with the NUJ.
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The inter-departmental committee, whose secretary was Sean 6 hEidean, decided
that it was not within the committee's remit to deal with the majorissue of policy, but
reported that it had learned Informally that 'the opposition of the NUJ to the supplying
of internal news in the 26 counties Is as strong as ever it was'. The most novel
suggestion made by the committee as a cost-cutting exercise was that the agency's fulltime journalists should be replaced by stringers who would excerpt stories from the
national media for export.
Such a practice of 'milking' news is, we understand, quite common In
the newspaper world ... The proprietors do not give approval of the
practice but they tacitly allow It so as to enable their best men to get
additional emoluments'. If this were done, it might be possible to run
a smaller agency which would, in addition, be more acceptable to
45
journalists.

45. Report of Inter-Departmental
Committee. 16 March 1955.
National Archives. S 154544 D.

By this time, however, the tremors of Imminent dissolution had again begun to make
themselves felt. J.P. Gallagher had resigned as General Manager. Roger Greene had
died: F.W. Padbury had been appointed In his place, together with a new Board. Conor
Cruise O'Brien had resigned, and with him, or so It seemed, some of the fight had gone
out of the Department of External Affairs, which now told the Government that 'the
material benefit which has accrued to the State from the operations of the agency has
46
hitherto been negligible' . The option of winding up the agency was again put on the
Cabinet table, but temporarily. withdrawn. The new Board, while It rejected the
Department of Posts and Telegraph's plan to 'milk' the national media for the INA's
export trade, was equally unrealistic when It proposed to External Affairs that the
Agency be given the monopoly of the distribution of news emanating from abroad. The
last option - disposal of the agency to the national newspapers - continued to be
officially regarded as desirable, but Impossible.
The agency might have dwindled gracefully to vanishing point over the following few
years but for two other, contemporary factors. One was the unremitting hostility of the
Irish Independent. which .of course generally supported the Inter~ Party Government. It
published a hostile leading article describing the INA as 'a pure extravagance' on 9
November 1954. It returned to the fray on 10 February 1955 with a plea to the
Government to 'spare the community further losses' by winding up this 'unqualified
47
failure' . On 9 January 1956 another leading article, Its arguments a virtual
paraphrase of those that had gone before, described the INA as an 'Indefensible venture'.
On 20 March its leader on the INA was entitled 'Pouring Money Down the Drain', and on
22 May It described a proposal to allow the INA to engage In the general dissemination of
news within Ireland as 'audacious'! Two days later, for good measure, it published two
anonymous letters giving similar arguments against the agency's continued existence.

46. Department of External Affairs
Memorandum for the Government,
13 January I 956. National
Archives, S 154544 D.

47. The Irish Times. In that splctt of
friendly rivalry which has
characterised
relationships
hetween the national media,
announced proudly on 30 April
I 955 that Its services to Its readers
would now be augmented by the
UP-INA service. This gesture,
coming as It did some five years
after the INA's Inauguration, was
presumably largely symbolic.

More significantly, perhaps, the INA was also losing potentiai allies within the
Cabinet. Early In 1956 the leader of the Labour Party, William Norton, wrote to Cosgrave
to complain at the INA's circulation to Irish newspapers of a niisleadingly sub-edited
version of a speech he had made to American Industrialists in the US. The misleading
text had in fact come from United Press and, although the INA had on Its own account
put out a correction and the full text of Norton's speech an hour later, The Irish Times
had used the offending version. Norton went for the jugular, copying his letter both to
the Taoiseach and to the Minister for Finance.
I gather, that there is no obligation on the Agency to see that the
reports which they are supplying to the press are In accordance with
public policy ... I have doubts on whether It Is doing the job It was set
46
up to do.

48. William Norton to John A
Costello and to Llam Cosgrave, 5
March 1956. National Archives, S
154544 D.

The last nail had been put .In the INA's coffin, but It took yet another change of
Government to finally Inter the corpse. The decision to close the INA was actually
announced by the Minister for Finance, Dr. James Ryan, on 8 May 1957, In advance of
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the formal Cabinet decision on 4 June. The Managing Editor and the Chairman
received a year's emoluments In lieu of notice. Executives got six months, journalists
three months, and administrative staff two months pay. In a pitiful coda, the NUJ
finally, and vainly, bestirred Itself on behalf of its colleagues whose efforts It had been
denigrating for most of the previous six years. Michael Mcinerney- whose personal bona
fides were hardly in doubt, and who was acting on behalf of the Irish Area Council of the
NUJ- wrote to the Taolseach on 13 May to say that the Union was 'profoundly shocked'
by the decision, affecting as it did the sixteen NUJ members who were still on the INA
staff, as well as 100 other members who acted as stringers. On 29 May the General
Secretary of the Union, H.J. Bradley, wrote from London to Mr de Valera to express his
Council's concern (in language which seemed to have been quarried directly from one of
Mr Sean MacBride's speeches) that Ireland, alone of the Western European countries,
should be without a national news agency, and Its perturbation 'that the employment of
a considerable number of journalists In Dublin, Belfast, London, and the United States,
50
would be affected by the closure of the agency' . With such unlikely mourners, and
with little fanfare, the INA finally closed Its doors. Its obituary was a five-paragraph
single-column story In The Irish Times, beginning: 'The Government-sponsored Irish
News Agency, which was established in 1950, closed down last night. Its news service
51
stopped at midnight' .

Conclusion
It is doubtful, given the circumstances of its birth, whether the INA could ever have

been an unqualified success. Mr MacBride's parental pride blinded him to its many
defects, and those who came after him were neither skillful enough nor, in the end,
committed enough to overcome the hostility of key personnel in the journalistic
profession and of the Department of Finance. One of these adversaries alone might have
been enough to sink the enterprise - and yet the fact that it survived for so long in the
teeth of such odds was Itself a tribute to the sinewy pertinacity of its staff. Many years
later Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, translated now to the cabinet table as Minister for Posts
and Telegraphs, returned to the theme with only a hint of wistfulness, urging the
creation of an Irish News Agency 'based on, and run by, the newspapers of Irela,nd
outside Dublin, with a certain amount of State support'. He said:
The concept I have in mind, is something distinct from the old Irish
News Agency ... A lot of good effort went to that Agency, and some of
the best journalists in the country worked for it. But from its
inception It suffered from certain radical defects. It was founded on
the sole initiative of the Government of the day, without having
enlisted the support of the press. Its ties to the State, and
dependence on the State, were too close and too great. And it was
aimed too much at the press outside this country, without being able
adequately to fulfil the basic function of a normal news agency,
which is to serve the press of its own country. I am convinced that a
really viable Irish news agency must answer the needs of Irish
newspapers, and must be controlled by them. It would also have to
have the support of the journalistic profession and the National
Union of Journalists. If those conditions could be fulftled the State
would be prepared to help, but Its role would have to be one of
52
support, not of leadership or control.

52. Speech to the Conference of .
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August 1973 (mimeo).

The wheel had come full circle.
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